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REFLECTIONS ON NEW YORK TIMES CO. V.
SULLIVAN, 50 YEARS LATER
ASHLEY MESSENGER*
The task before us today is to reflect on the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.' But before we
reflect on Sullivan, let us take a moment to reflect on journalism.
Journalists, for the most part, consider themselves the "Fourth
,,2
Estate. They believe that they serve as a watchdog on those in power
and are an indispensable part of the system of checks and balances in
American democracy. They aspire to tell us the "truth," although most
reporters are savvy enough to understand that "truth" is a messy concept
that sometimes simply means "accuracy." A reporter can accurately
convey what a politician said, even if the politician is lying. The reporter
may be able to show the politician is lying and explain the underlying
dispute or facts, but an accurate report of events would necessarily
include a repetition of the lie. And although news reports strive to be
precisely accurate, there are occasions in which it is considered perfectly
acceptable to dance around accuracy for the sake of conveying a larger
truth.
. Ashley Messenger is in-house counsel for NPR, specializing in First
Amendment and media law issues, and adjunct faculty at the University of Michigan
Law School. I am grateful to Len Niehoff for his comments on earlier drafts of this
article.
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. See Marin R. Scordato, The Elusive Paradigm of the Press, 72 B.U. L. REV.
673, 675-76 (book review) (describing the origins of the term "Fourth Estate" in
American popular culture).
3. See, e.g., JOHN D'AGATA & JiM FINGAL, THE LIFESPAN OF A FACT (2012).
This principle is also reflected in some of the hyperbole cases, such as Greenbelt
Coop. Publ'g Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970). In Greenbelt, the Court
acknowledged that the newspaper accurately reported that Bresler was accused of
"blackmail" at a city council meeting. Id. at 13. The Court also noted that it would
not be accurate to use the term "blackmail" in the literal sense of the word, but in
context it was clear that the term was used to express the viewpoint or mindset of
those who "considered Bresler's negotiating position extremely unreasonable." Id. at
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It is often argued that the First Amendment should provide broad
protection to journalism because of the great importance of learning the
truth. Despite the occasional falsehood, it is important to protect
journalists because the need for the overall truth is greater than the harm
caused by a relatively minuscule falsity. Accordingly, journalists should
not be exposed to aggressive libel judgments that could bankrupt
otherwise well-meaning and professional members of the press, or cause
them to censure newsworthy information out of fear of suit.
Courts, however, struggle with what the First Amendment
should mean and its relationship to truth. Commentators have developed
various "theories" of the First Amendment to explain why we should or
should not protect speech in various circumstances, some of which
emphasize "truth" in some form or another, and others that do not. This
article compares the various theories of the First Amendment to what the
Court did in Sullivan and to what journalists actually do, and it concludes
that while Sullivan helped the news media in some regard, it failed to
establish constitutional protection that is truly consistent with the
interests of high quality journalism.
Part I summarizes some of the theories of the First Amendment.
Part II outlines what the Court did in Sullivan and what the practical
impact was. Part III explains why the rule adopted in Sullivan and
influenced by the "marketplace of ideas" theory has proven to be
problematic for news organizations; it also argues that a speech act
theory is more suitable for understanding libel cases. Finally, Part IV
summarizes the impact of Sullivan on modern media and concludes with
an argument that it is time to reflect on why we protect speech so that we
may consider theories and adopt rules that better serve our
communicative goals in civil society.
I. THEORIES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
There are a several theories that courts, scholars, and
commentators use to explain or justify why the First Amendment should
or should not protect various kinds of speech. One of the most well-
known theories is known as the "marketplace of ideas." This theory
14. Thus, while the statement was not literally true, it expressed a "truth" about how
Bresler was viewed by the speaker.
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asserts that the truth will eventually prevail as a result of uninhibited
public discourse. Accordingly, ideas should be aired freely so as to allow
the public to effectively compare competing viewpoints. The notion is
well-established in First Amendment jurisprudence and is often
attributed to Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United States,4 in
which he said, "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market . . ..
The marketplace theory actually takes two forms. In one version,
described above, the goal is to serve a truth-seeking function. Free
expression aids in the search for truth because it allows truth and falsity
to "compete," and, presumably, truth will prevail.6 In the other form, the
goal is not necessarily to search for truth, but simply to have a diversity
of ideas available to the public.7 In either case, the premise is that any
"truths" should not be handed down from authorities, but people should
be free to evaluate ideas on their own merits.
Another well-known theory, attributed to the writings of
Alexander Meiklejohn is that we should allow speech that helps people
8
engage in democracy and self-governance. This theory gives great
leeway to speech on political issues, but leaves open the possibility of
censoring speech that is not helpful to democracy. Moreover, Meiklejohn
takes a dismissive view towards the marketplace theory and the
permissiveness it grants to a citizen to "believe whatever will serve his
own private interests."9 Meiklejohn does not believe that the First
4. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
5. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
6. See Paul G. Chevigny, Philosophy of Language and Free Expression, 55
N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 158-61 (1980) (analyzing the "free trade in ideas" metaphor
advanced by Justice Holmes).
7. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 548-54 (1977) (describing the "diversity" model of the
marketplace of ideas theory).
8. William H. Rehnquist, The First Amendment: Freedom, Philosophy, and the
Law, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 4 (1976) (describing Meiklejohn's theory as a form of
utilitarian political philosophy).
9. Blasi, supra note 7, at 557 (quoting ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 73 (Oxford Univ. Press
1965)).
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Amendment is "a device for the winning of new truth . . . . It is a device
for the sharing of whatever truth has been won.,,to
Another theory is that freedom of speech is justified as a matter
of individual autonomy; that freedom of speech is a natural right and a
basic liberty of civil society.I' In this view, no further justification is
needed. It is the government that must overcome a strong presumption in
favor of freedom if it seeks to restrict speech.
The "checking value" theory is yet another justification that is
offered to support First Amendment rights, especially the principles of a
free press. The theory is that freedom of expression has value, at least in
part, because of the function it performs in checking the abuse of official
power.12 The founding fathers were extremely distrustful of government
power and wanted to ensure that citizens had a mechanism for keeping
the government in check; therefore, the First Amendment expressly
reserves the right of the people to speak out against government abuse.
One question is whether the "checking value" theory applies when the
speech at issue relates to private power rather than government power.14
Although its origins may have been in the desire to check government
power, citizens also have a valid interest in ensuring that private actors
do not abuse power, and it may be that the checking function can be
applied to any situation in which there is an interest in countering abuse.
Finally, there is an esoteric but, I think, extremely valuable
theory that relies on the philosophy of language (particularly "speech
act" theory) and an understanding about the essence of human
communication.' 5 This theory recognizes that humans communicate in
10. Id. at 561.
11. See id. at 544; Rehnquist, supra note 8, at 6-7.
12. See Blasi, supra note 7, at 523. See also David A. Anderson, The Origins
of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REv. 455, 493 (1983) (explaining that the
legislative history of the press clause supports Blasi's view that the checking
function of the press was an important value to the founders).
13. See Anderson, supra note 12, at 491 (arguing that the press clause was
necessary because "it was universally assumed that the press would indeed provide
such a check and that government therefore would seek to suppress it").
14. See Blasi, supra note 7, at 539-41 (arguing that the abuse of government
power is worse than the abuse of private power).
15. See Chevigny, supra note 6, at 161-76; see also Lawrence Byard Solum,
Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First Amendment Freedom of
Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 54 (1988-89) (arguing that Habermas' theory of
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many different ways and for many different reasons. A speaker will
engage in a "speech act," and there is some burden upon the audience to
determine the "meaning" of the statement that was made. The speaker
and the audience may engage in a dialogue to determine what was meant,
and the audience may have to sift through statements to determine what
is credible and what can reasonably be drawn from speech. In this view,
there is little reason to censor speech, and in fact, there is great reason to
encourage more speech to facilitate interpersonal understanding. I have
called this the "speech act model" of the First Amendment and have
criticized modern libel law on these grounds.17
If you ask journalists what they do and which theory best fits
their notion of their role in society, I suspect that many would relate best
to the "checking value" theory. Journalists see themselves as the "Fourth
Estate;" they "comfort the afflicted and afflict the comfortable."' 8 If they
do anything, journalists provide a check on abuses of power, and the
checking value theory is, rightfully, often used to justify strong
protection for the press.
Journalists might also relate to the Mieklejohnian theory, at least
insofar as it protects speech on political issues. However, they might
object to the censorial power of the theory with respect to statements that
are deemed "unhelpful" to democracy. Journalists may also like the
notion of individual autonomy, and the libertarian model certainly would
offer broad protection for free speech.
The marketplace of ideas theory presents an interesting problem.
In general, we tend to think that the theory rejects an authoritarian
imposition of "truth," allowing citizens to sift among the ideas in the
marketplace. This theory should offer broad protections for speech, one
would think. However, because of the assumption that there is an
underlying truth-seeking function involved, it has manifested in such a
way as to limit speech. In Sullivan, the Court adhered to the marketplace
communicative action, which is based on speech act theory, can be used to
understand the structure of the First Amendment).
16. See Chevigny, supra note 6, at 161-76.
17. See Ashley Messenger, The Problem with New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan: An Argument for Moving from a "Falsity Model" of Libel Law to a
"Speech Act Model, " 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 172 (2012).
18. This quote is attributed to Finley Peter Dunne, a 1 9 th century writer.
FINLEY PETER DUNNE, OBSERVATIONS BY MR. DOOLEY 240 (1902).
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of ideas theory and developed a rule that does not necessarily serve
well the interests ofjournalism or of an informed public.
II. WHAT SULLIVAN DID
A. The Court's Decision
In Sullivan, the Supreme Court did a great thing in granting
constitutional protection to speech in libel cases. In many states, libel
was essentially a strict liability claim; if a plaintiff could prove that a
defamatory statement had been published by the defendant, then the
defendant would typically be liable unless he could prove it was true
(often difficult to do, even if the statement were in fact true) or that some
20
other privilege (such as "fair comment") applied. Mistakes, however,
were not granted any protection at all.
It is important to acknowledge that the facts of Sullivan were
inflammatory at the time, insofar as the statements at issue were related
to the civil rights movement, a matter of great public concern about
which citizens held strong and divisive views. A political advertisement
ran in the New York Times that criticized the conduct of the police
officers who treated civil rights demonstrators badly.21 L.B. Sullivan, the
Montgomery, Alabama Public Safety Commissioner, sued for libel,
arguing that it defamed him in his role overseeing police conduct.22
As has been previously noted by others, the Court could have
ignored the larger constitutional issues and decided the case on simpler,
narrower grounds; for example, it could have found that Sullivan was not
truly the subject of the statements, as he was never named in the ad.23
But instead, the Court took the opportunity to rule that elected officials
cannot prevail in a libel action unless they can prove that the defendant
19. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
20. See id. at 267, 279 (explaining the privilege of "fair comment" and noting
the difficulty of proving truth or privilege under a common law rule).
21. Id. at 256.
22. Id. at 256-57.
23. See Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U.
CHI. L. REv. 782, 792 (1986).
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acted with "actual malice," defined as knowledge of falsity or reckless
24disregard of the truth.
Sullivan is notable for another reason: it is not a case about
"journalism." Although the defendant is a prototypical media company,
the statement at issue was not from a news report, but rather, from a paid
25political advertisement. The point was not to convey facts in a
reasonable or objective matter, but to comment on contentious social
issues. The Court's now-famous quote that "we consider this case against
the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials" 26 must be
understood in the context of supporting political debate, which is not
necessarily expected to be fair, neutral, factual, or reasonable. Politics is
often not about "truth" in a limited, purely factual sense as much as it is
about "truth" in the much larger sense of expressing values.
And yet, despite the context, the Court chose to implement a rule
that relies crucially on some notion of a statement being "true" or "false"
in a factual sense and the degree to which that distinction was known to
27
the defendant. In doing so, the Court adopted the "marketplace of
ideas" theory, stating that the First Amendment "presupposes that right
conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues,
than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and
always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all."2 8 We can draw
24. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280.
25. Id. at 256.
26. Id. at 270.
27. In many cases, this rule doesn't make sense. See, e.g., David Kohler, Forty
Years After New York Times v. Sullivan: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 83 OR.
L. REV. 1203, 1210 (2004) (noting that "Westmoreland v. CBS has often been cited
as an example of the inadequacies of the Sullivan rule" because the case was based
on allegations "about which our own government could not even agree ... and
which in all likelihood was not subject to definitive proof either way"); see also
Messenger, supra note 17, at 180-89 (noting the failure of Sullivan to distinguish
among various reasons why false statements may be disseminated, including some
legitimate reasons that society should want to protect).
28. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 (quoting United States v. Assoc. Press, 52 F.
Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N. Y. 1943)). To be fair, the Court referenced ideas that could
have been related to other theories of the First Amendment. The Court noted that
criticism of government officials is an important part of the democratic process. Id
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from the Court's opinion that it placed a high value on the truth-seeking
function of speech and apparently concluded that there was no value in
statements that were known to be false.2 9 To continue the marketplace
analogy, the Court's rule suggests that any idea can be "sold" in the
marketplace as long as one does not know it to be "defective," so to
speak. In fact, the Court was willing to allow for "defects," noting that
errors are inevitable. 3 0 Falsity is not the problem; the problem is knowing
a statement to be false. Conveying a known or probable falsity was
assumed to be contrary to the goal of getting to truth.
Thus, the Court freed defendants from liability in cases where
they did not know an allegation about public officials to be false, which
was a great departure from the common law rule and which would give
much greater latitude to speech involving public affairs. The rule has
turned out to be quite effective at accomplishing the narrow task to
which it was directed, but the real impact has been both spotty and
narrow.
B. The Immediate Impact
What has been the impact of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan on
the media? A lot, and yet, not much.
The rule that public officials (and public figures) must prove
"actual malice" in order to prevail in libel cases has been the law my
entire life. I have no personal knowledge of what it was like to work for
or counsel a media company in the absence of such a rule (at least in the
United States-more on that thought later).
at 272-73 (suggesting a Meiklejohnian view). That discussion of the stewardship of
public officials was a fundamental principle. Id. at 275 (related to the "checking
value" theory). That it is a "prized American privilege to speak one's mind . . . ." Id.
at 269 (citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941)) (an individualist
perspective). And that censorship does not change minds. Id. at 270 (referencing an
anti-authoritarian theory of the First Amendment; see John M. Kang, In Praise of
Hostility: Antiauthoritarianism as Free Speech Principle, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y. 351 (2012). However, the Court seems to have placed the most emphasis on
the search for truth.
29. Later, the Court expressly stated, "there is no constitutional value in false
statements of fact." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
30. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271-72.
31. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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Although I can imagine what it must have been like without any
form of constitutional protection in libel cases, I thought it would be
prudent to ask someone who does, in fact, have personal knowledge of
what it was like to practice law and represent media companies before
Sullivan was decided.
James Goodale was the in-house lawyer for the New York Times
at the time of Sullivan. (He now works for Debevoise & Plimpton in
New York.) He graciously spoke with me to answer my questions about
what it was like pre-Sullivan and in its immediate aftermath. As I
expected, and as the lore goes, he felt that Sullivan did, indeed, have a
great impact on the media and may have saved the New York Times
from bankruptcy.
He said that before Sullivan was decided, there were stories that
simply did not run because the paper couldn't prove that the story was
true. Even if the reporter had several reliable sources, reliance on a
source, alone, was not enough to save the press from liability. The
burden would be on the paper to prove that the statements or allegations
were true. Sometimes, reporters could find creative ways to show that
allegations were true, but sometimes, stories did not run because even
though the allegations were credible and newsworthy, they could not be
proven true.
The rule announced in Sullivan was simple: when a public
official sues a newspaper for libel, the newspaper cannot be required to
prove truth in order to defeat the suit; rather, the public official bears the
burden of establishing the newspaper knew the statement was false (or
acted in reckless disregard of the truth). Yet, Sullivan proved to be a
great blessing because it gave the press a bit more leeway to publish
credible and newsworthy allegations related to public officials. Thus,
even though Sullivan was about political speech as opposed to
"journalism," it did eventually provide some benefit to the news media
insofar as the rule protected the media from a narrow set of claims.
Interestingly, Goodale said that the paper did not change its
practices much in the years immediately following Sullivan; the paper
was still quite cautious. It realized that plaintiff-side libel lawyers were
not swayed from filing suits, and the paper would still incur the expense
of litigation even if the paper could prevail in the end. But through the
1970s, there were a slew of cases decided in favor of libel defendants,
and plaintiff-side lawyers began to realize how difficult it would be to
4312014] REFLECTIONS ON SULLIVAN
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win a libel case. By the 1980s, libel cases began to taper off, and the
protections of Sullivan began to have a practical impact. 32
The case has been widely praised for changing constitutional law
and expanding free speech. All of this is wonderful. But in retrospect, it
is important to note that Sullivan did not establish adequate constitutional
protection for speakers in libel cases. As I have previously argued, the
weakness of Sullivan is its reliance on a false premise: that there is no
constitutional value in a knowingly false statement. 3 3 But that false
premise itself is most likely based on another false assumption about the
relationship between statements and "truth." Theories of the First
Amendment that emphasize "truth" are problematic if "truth" is narrowly
defined to refer to whether statements are true based solely on the syntax
of the statement. There are times when a statement is false on its face but
nevertheless can be used in a context that conveys valuable information.
In such cases, we have to look to other First Amendment principles, such
as the checking value of the press, or find a theory that better fits the
nature of human communication, such as speech act theory.
III. WHY SPEECH ACT THEORY FITS BETTER [N LIBEL CASES
A. The Problem with Assessing "Truth"
We like to believe that truth is out there and that it is easy to
discern. "Truth" can compete with "falsity" in the marketplace of ideas,
and "truth" will prevail. We tend to think that truth and falsity come in
the form of statements.
We often identify statements as "true" or "false," and libel law
presupposes that statements can be parsed this way. But consider these
statements:34
32. Indeed, libel cases have changed quite a bit in the last 20 years. There are
fewer cases against mass media companies and more cases against individuals; there
has also been an increase in claims by private persons, as opposed to public officials
or public figures. See David S. Ardia, Freedom of Speech, Defamation and
Injunctions, 55 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 10-14 (2013).
33. See Messenger, supra note 17, at 180-81 (arguing that the actual malice
rule fails to account for the myriad ways humans use speech, including the use of a
false statement for purposes other than trying to persuade someone of its truth).
34. This example is an elaboration on the example I use in my prior article,
supra note 17. The underlying point was that some members of the electorate hold
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(1) President Obama is secretly a Muslim who wants to harm
America.
(2) John says that President Obama is secretly a Muslim who
wants to harm America.
These statements contain the same idea-that President Obama
is secretly a Muslim who wants to harm America-but they have
different "truth conditions." Statement (1) is true if and only if President
Obama actually is hiding the fact that he is a Muslim and wants to harm
America. Statement (2) is true if and only if John says that he is. It is
possible, even likely, that Statement (1) is false, but Statement (2) is
true. And yet libel law does not make a distinction between these two
statements. In either case, President Obama could, in theory, bring a libel
claim, arguing that each statement conveys a false fact (that he is secretly
a Muslim who wants to harm America) and that the speaker (the person
reporting these statements) knows the underlying assertion is false. The
law does not account for the different purposes these statements may
have, nor does it (officially) account for the reasons why the statements
may be repeated, such as to explain why a portion of the electorate
claims it would not vote for President Obama. Given the common law
republication rule and the constitutional protection of the actual malice
rule, a reporter is arguably not protected if he repeats the statements and
knows they are false, even though there may be a perfectly rational,
newsworthy justification in explaining the mindset of the electorate, and
even though no one is deceived into believing any false facts.
This is where the goal of "truth" creates problems. The principle
is valid most of the time, but not always. There are times when one
knows a statement to be false, but the statement is not being made to
prove the truth of the matter asserted; the statement deserves repetition
because it conveys some other relevant information, such as to show the
mindset or motive of a person. The notion that President Obama is a
Muslim falls into this category. When reporters convey the false belief
false beliefs about President Obama, and even though their underlying beliefs are
false, the fact that people hold those beliefs is true and also an important fact to
know to understand the world. Thus, if we really want to protect the search for truth,
the goal need not be to ensure that each individual statement is true on its face; but
rather, we need to allow for false statements when they convey some other useful
information about the world-such as the fact that people hold false beliefs.
35. For the purposes of this article, I assume the statement is false.
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held by a segment of the electorate, they are not trying to persuade the
audience that President Obama is a Muslim or to perpetuate that notion.
Instead, the reporters are generally trying to explain that some citizens
hold this view, whether it is right or wrong, and that such a belief is
affecting the outcome of the election. This kind of information is helpful
to our understanding of our society and our world, it has informational
and expressive value, it conveys a broad truth about the world (the fact
that people believe false things), and it should be exactly the kind of
statement the First Amendment should protect. And yet the rule in
Sullivan would offer a reporter no protection for making this statement.
This is one reason why we should abandon the emphasis on the technical
truth or falsity of a statement and instead focus on the speech act at issue.
There is a second problem, though, which is a bit subtler and a
lot trickier. Speakers, and journalists in particular, are not magical,
omniscient creatures. They are human beings with some knowledge and
some strengths and some weaknesses. We ask too much when we ask
journalists to provide us with "truth." What we can reasonably ask is that
the journalist provide us with information-and provide enough context
and sourcing so that we, the audience, can fairly assess the credibility of
that information in a coherent manner. It is up to us, the audience, to
determine "truth," individually and then collectively. It is not the duty of
journalists to cohere all the data in the universe and deliver the "truth" to
us, neatly packaged and ready for consumption. The bias of modem libel
law leaves the audience out of the equation and ignores the process that
truly underlies the "marketplace of ideas" theory, which should be seen
more as a rejection of claims of authority than as an obligation to seek or
deliver truth.3 6
It is too easy to believe that a statement is either "true" or
"false." But courts have noted again and again that there are many
statements for which that kind of assessment is difficult if not
36. It has been argued that Sullivan actually got it right in this regard, but that
later cases abandoned the notion that the audience has an epistemic duty to evaluate
statements. See generally Richard H. Weisberg, The First Amendment Degraded:
Milkovich v. Lorain and a Continuing Sense of Loss on Its 20th Birthday, 62 S.C. L.
REV. 157 (2010) (arguing that Sullivan and the later "hyperbole" cases properly
acknowledged the interpretive role of the audience, but the Court later moved toward
"fact policing" in Milkovich).
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impossible.37 We can easily see that value statements ("broccoli is
delicious") are not susceptible to categorization as true or false because
they reflect only the view of the speaker. And yet, when it comes to other
kinds of statements, we forget that the statement reflects the view or
mindset of the speaker, and we tend to impose some authority to the
statement simply because it was made. The assumption that statements
have authority merely because they exist is foolish at best, and delusional
at worst. Statements must be judged on their credibility, which includes
an evaluation of their source, the source's source, the basis upon which
any knowledge is claimed, and the relationship of that information to all
other relevant evidence. To illustrate this concept, consider a simple
statement, "The dog is inside the house."
If the speaker is on the phone with you, and he is inside the
house with the dog and is telling you that the dog is inside the house
because he is there, in person, and can see the fact that the dog is inside
the house contemporaneously with his statement, then, assuming the
speaker does not have a track record of lying nor a motive to do so, the
statement is credible evidence that the dog is, in fact, inside the house.
The audience would be well-justified in believing the statement to be
"true." It is possible, however, that the speaker is lying, but you, the
audience, would have no way to know that until additional facts are
acquired, such as coming home to find the dog missing and a security
camera showing the dog running away early that morning. If that were to
occur, you would be well-justified in doubting the credibility of the
speaker on future occasions. The speaker's statement always reflects his
own credibility, but does not always reflect the actual facts.
If the speaker is with you, at another location, and you ask,
"Where is the dog?," and he responds, "The dog is in the house," then it
would be fair for you to ask, "How do you know?" The answer may be
that the dog was in the house when he left this morning, the doors and
windows were closed and locked, and therefore, it is reasonable to
conclude that the dog is still in the house. The statement that the dog is in
37. Courts have struggled in particular with determining whether statements
are "factual assertions" that could be proven true or false, or "opinion," which
should be protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Levin v. McPhee, 119 F.3d
189, 196 (2d Cir. 1997) ("No area of modem libel law can be murkier than the
cavernous depths of this inquiry." (quoting Sanford, Libel and Privacy, § 5.1 (Supp.
1997))).
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the house expresses his belief that the dog is in the house, not
contemporaneous personal knowledge. Nevertheless, the belief is very
reasonable. Absent some unusual circumstance, the dog is most likely
still in the house. Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon you, the audience, to
ask for the basis of the speaker's claim in order to have ajustified belief
that it is true.
Alternately, the speaker might tell you the dog is in the house,
but, in fact, the doors and windows are wide open, the dog has a habit of
escaping, and the speaker has not been home in a few days. You might
know all these circumstances, or you might not. If you know all that
information and you believe that the dog is in the house simply because
the speaker said it, even though he has no personal knowledge of the
facts and there are many reasons why the statement might not be true,
then your belief is not well-justified. This is a separate issue from
whether the fact is true. The dog might or might not be in the house (the
issue of whether the statement is true), but you lack a well-justified belief
in asserting the statement to be true or false. Nevertheless, you might
assert it anyway. People believe things without having adequate
justification all the time, and they assert these things simply because they
believe them, because they are human and humans do that.
If you do not know all the extenuating circumstances and believe
that the dog is in the house simply because the speaker told you that, then
the issue is a bit more complicated. Is the speaker generally credible? Do
you know? Perhaps you just met this person. Or, perhaps you have
known him a long time but he has not lied before. Unless you know that
the speaker has a tendency to lie, or at least to make statements without
any basis for them, then you might be inclined to trust the speaker. This
is another thing humans do: we tend to trust each other in the absence of
evidence that we should not. (And even sometimes then we still trust,
albeit unwisely.) The rational response to the assertion that the dog is in
the house would be to ask, "How do you know?" The audience bears
some responsibility in assessing the credibility of the information
conveyed, and that requires having some information about the source of
the information and the ability to assess the credibility of the source.
Moreover, the audience bears some responsibility in assessing the
credibility of the speaker's statement without regard to whether the topic
is the location of the dog, a politician's sexual proclivities, the situation
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in the Middle East, a declaration of love, the quality of food at the new
restaurant in town, or anything else.38
What does this have to do with news reporting and media?
Journalists are no different from any other person when it comes to
speaking and hearing information, except that they are, quite explicitly, a
medium. We all play this role sometimes, in some capacity, but those
who claim to be journalists are claiming this role professionally. What
we can reasonably expect is not that they will deliver us "the truth" in a
convenient bite-sized package, but that they will adhere to the norms of
reporting. The norms of reporting first and foremost require journalists to
faithfully convey what was said. Second, norms require a journalist to
convey the basis for the statement, assuming it is known. Journalists can
reasonably be expected to ask "how do you know?" and to convey the
source of information or the lack thereof. But the troubling reality is that,
in many cases involving newsworthy issues, speakers do not have the
kind of personal knowledge of the facts that we hope for. In many cases,
a person is expressing belief, and that belief may be well-justified or
poorly justified. In some cases, sources outright lie. The journalist must
do his best to assess the credibility of the speaker and the validity of the
basis for statements. This places journalists in a difficult position: either
convey the statement with as much contextual information as possible so
that the new audience can assess the facts for itself, or make an
assessment about the credibility of various speakers and only convey that
which one finds credible. In the first case, journalists are criticized for
"repeating" false statements or statements that are not credible. In the
latter case, journalists are criticized for failing to provide the "whole
story" and letting the audience decide for itself. Which is the better
course of action has been a long-standing debate in the field of
journalism ethics, 39 and the practical reality is that journalists will be
criticized regardless of which option they choose. Worse, the law will
not always protect the journalist because Sullivan imposed a rule that
38. Other scholars have noted the importance of considering the role of an
active, interpreting audience in libel cases. See, e.g., Weisberg, supra note 33.
39. Jay Rosen, a professor of journalism at New York University, has written
extensively on this debate about how news should be presented, and captured the
problem concisely in this post on NPR's revised Ethics Handbook. Jay Rosen, NPR
Tries to Get its Pressthink Right, JAY ROSEN'S PRESSTHINK (Feb. 26, 2012, 5:15
PM), http://pressthink.org/2012/02/npr-tries-to-get-its-pressthink-right/.
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privileges the literal truth of a statement over the purpose for or context
in which a statement is conveyed.
Journalists play a distinct role insofar as they are the initial
audience for the original speaker, and then they act as a speaker to
convey the information obtained to a new audience. In the journalist's
role as "audience," he takes in the information and should ask questions
about the credibility of the speaker and the basis for the statement. Then,
in his role as speaker, he takes what he has obtained and his assessment
and makes a statement of his own. This statement should be taken on its
own merits, and we should look at the motive or mindset of the
journalist, just as we would of the original speaker, but the journalist's
speech and intent will often be different from the speech and intent of the
original speaker as a matter of course, simply because they are
differently situated. On the other hand, there are times when the
"journalist" is indeed the initial speaker, as often happens in the case of
commentary. If the speaker is relying on documentation from which he
draws conclusions, the basis for the statements should be explained, and
made available to the extent possible, so that the audience can assess the
credibility of the statements for itself. In any event, the journalist's words
should be interpreted in context to see what kind of communication it is.
In sum, it makes sense to consider the type and purpose of
expression rather than looking only at the truth or falsity of the
statement. This principle is well-illustrated by the cases that followed
Sullivan. Those cases also help illustrate why the speech act model is a
better theory to explain First Amendment protection in libel cases.
B. The Confusion That Followed Sullivan.
From the time Sullivan was decided in 1964 until Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc.40 in 1971, the Court applied the principles of Sullivan
in over a dozen cases.41 After that, however, the Court seemed to lose its
40. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
41. Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971); Time, Inc. v.
Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971);
Greenbelt Publ'g Ass'n. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563 (1968); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Beckley
Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967); Associated Press v. Walker, 388
U.S. 130 (1967); Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Time, Inc. v. Hill,
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focus on the principle it wanted to enforce-that debates on matters of
public concern should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. I am of the
opinion that the Court's instincts were generally good and that the Court
truly wanted to protect valuable, expressive speech, but the Court
struggled to articulate clear rules and principles in subsequent libel cases
because it had adopted a rule based on the technical truth or falsity of the
syntax of a statement instead of looking at the expressive purpose of the
speech. The conflict can be seen most clearly by contrasting Rosenbloom
with Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,42 the two cases in which the Court
struggled to articulate a rule for evaluating liability in libel cases when
the person defamed was a "private figure," as opposed to a "public
figure" or "public official."
In Rosenbloom, the Court extended the protections of Sullivan to
statements made about private figures if the matter at issue is one of
public concern. The news reports in Rosenbloom involved allegations
that George Rosenbloom was distributing "obscene material[s] ."4 The
Court quoted two of the news reports at issue. The first stated:
City Cracks Down on Smut Merchants
The Special Investigations Squad raided the home
of George Rosenbloom in the 1800 block of Vesta
Street this afternoon. Police confiscated 1,000
allegedly obscene books at Rosenbloom's home
and arrested him on charges of possession of
obscene literature. The Special Investigations
Squad also raided a barn in the 20 Hundred block
of Welsh Road near Bustleton Avenue and
confiscated 3,000 obscene books. Capt. Ferguson
says he believes they have hit the supply of a main
distributor of obscene material in Philadelphia.44
The second stated:
385 U.S. 374 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Linn v. Plant Guard
Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
42. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
43. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 32.
44. Id. at 33.
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Federal District Judge Lord, will hear arguments
today from two publishers and a distributor all
seeking an injunction against Philadelphia Police
Commissioner Howard Leary . .. District Attorney
James C. Crumlish . .. a local television station and
a newspaper . .. ordering them to lay off the smut
literature racket.
The girlie-book peddlers say the police crackdown
and continued reference to their borderline
literature as smut or filth is hurting their business.
Judge Lord refused to issue a temporary injunction
when he was first approached. Today he'll decide
the issue. It will set a precedent . . . and if the
injunction is not granted ... it could signal an even
more intense effort to rid the city of pornography.45
The Justices issued five separate opinions, with a plurality
agreeing that the statements should be protected, although on different
grounds. Justice Brennan, who wrote the Sulllivan opinion, recognized
that the issues reported were matters of public concern and noted that
they do not become less so merely because the accused is a private
person rather than a public figure.46 He then presciently notes:
Further reflection over the years since New York
Times was decided persuades us that the view of
the "public official" or "public figure" as assuming
the risk of defamation by voluntarily thrusting
himself into the public eye bears little relationship
either to the values protected by the First
Amendment or to the nature of our society. We
have recognized that "[e]xposure of the self to
others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in
a civilized community." Voluntarily or not, we are
all "public" men to some degree. Conversely, some
45. Id. at 34-35.
46. Id. at 43.
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aspects of the lives of even the most public men
fall outside the area of matters of public or general
concern. Thus, the idea that certain "public" figures
have voluntarily exposed their entire lives to public
inspection, while private individuals have kept
theirs carefully shrouded from public view is, at
best, a legal fiction. In any event, such a distinction
could easily produce the paradoxical result of
dampening discussion of issues of public or general
concern because they happen to involve private
citizens while extending constitutional
encouragement to discussion of aspects of the lives
of "public figures" that are not in the area of public
47or general concern.
The Court therefore concluded that the actual malice test should
have been applied, and the plaintiff cannot prevail absent clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant acted with actual malice.48
A couple of years later, in Gertz, the Court took a completely
different approach. In that case, a magazine, American Opinion,
published an article that claimed there was a conspiracy to frame a police
officer that had shot and killed a boy.49 Elmer Gertz, who was not
involved in the criminal trial of the officer but who was the lawyer for
the boy's family, was a target of the article. It claimed that Gertz had a
police file that took "a big, Irish cop to lift"; that he was an official of the
Marxist League for Industrial Democracy; and that he was a "Leninist"
and a "Communist-fronter."o In fact, Gertz had no criminal record, he
had never been a member of the Marxist League, and there was no basis
for the charge that he was a "Leninist" or a "Communist-fronter." 5
47. Id at 47-48. This same idea is expressed by Kohler, supra note 25, at 1222
(citations omitted) (noting that the public/private distinction makes little sense,
especially in journalism, because stories are chosen not always for the prominence of
the subject but for the importance of an issue to the audience-and not everyone
involved will necessarily be a public figure).
48. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 55.
49. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 325 (1974).
50. Id at 326.
5 1. Id.
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There was no source provided for the facts claimed, but the editor's note
that accompanied the article said that the author engaged in "extensive
52
research" into the police officer's case.
In Gertz, the Court declared that there is "no constitutional value
in false statements of fact.' ,5 However, the Court also noted that errors
are inevitable, and it would not adequately serve First Amendment
interests to impose strict liability for errors.54 Thus, the Court required
some level of fault, but, in this case, it declined to extend the Sullivan
rule to statements involving private figures, ruling instead that states may
decide for themselves which standard of fault to apply in cases involving
private figures, as long as strict liability is not imposed. The Court
wanted to ensure that reputational interests were adequately protected.
Thus, the Court in Gertz did the exact opposite of what it did in
Rosenbloom.
In both cases, Rosenbloom and Gertz, the Court seems to have
struggled to come up with a rule to justify what seemed like intuitively
correct outcomes. The Court wanted to allow for the expression of
information and ideas about matters of public concern, but it also wanted
to avoid unwarranted harm to reputation when the motives of the speaker
were inconsistent with First Amendment principles. The Court's
dilemma, though, is inextricably linked with its focus on the knowledge
of truth or falsity of the statements. If it had looked instead to the speech
act at issue, the Court could have reached the same outcomes with less
confusion.
In Rosenbloom, the statements were reports of police conduct
and of a lawsuit. Under a speech act analysis, the statements in the first
report should be protected because they are "reporting." They clearly
explain what the police have done, and the audience should understand
that the fact that police took action does not necessarily mean that the
materials are, in fact, "obscene." As long as the statement was a faithful
report of what the police claimed, the statement should be protected.
There is constitutional value in the information because it shows what
police did and said, regardless of whether the underlying facts are "true."
52. Id. at 327.
53. Id. at 340.
54. Id
55. Id at 347.
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In fact, if it turned out not to be true, there is value in knowing that the
police acted overzealously.
The statements in the second report (that the publications are
"smut") should be protected as an expression of "belief' or a
"conclusion" because they reflect a particular viewpoint about which
reasonable people can disagree. Even if the audience were to agree that
the publications are "smut," the adoption of that view should be based on
a subjective agreement that the characterization is apt; it would be
unfounded to adopt the view that the publications are smut without
additional information about what is actually contained therein.
Importantly, with respect to the statements in both reports, the news
media never claimed to have seen the materials or have actual knowledge
of what was in the publications. It was repeating the claims of police,
whose actions are newsworthy regardless of whether they are accurately
56characterizing the materials.
In Gertz, however, the statements could fairly be the basis for a
libel claim because they may constitute a "telling."57 The information is
conveyed as factual but without any sourcing or clarification that permits
the reader to assess the credibility of the statement. Instead, the article
purports to be the product of "extensive research." The author, in
essence, is asking the audience to accept the facts stated as facts based on
his say-so. He is claiming expertise and denying the audience the
contextual information to assess the credibility of the statements. Thus,
one could conclude that the speaker's primary purpose was to state facts,
represent them as true, claim the credibility to know the truth, and urge
the audience to adopt those facts as true on the basis of the speaker's
statement. Assuming the author was successful in creating the desired
perlocutionary effect in the hearer, the statement constituted a "telling,"
56. In many states, modernly, the first report would be protected by "fair report
privilege," and the statements in the second report (that the publications are "smut")
would most likely be deemed "opinion." As I have noted, courts and states have
developed other tests to offer protection for statements that have value. See
Messenger, supra note 17, at 189-209.
57. 1 have argued that libel claims should be permitted only when the speech
act at issue constitutes a "telling," which is an effort to persuade an audience to
accept a fact as true based solely on the statement of the speaker. See Messenger,
supra note 17, at 220.
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and the Court could have allowed Gertz to move forward with his claim
on that basis.
It is not that Sullivan was a bad case or that the rule set forth is
entirely wrong. In fact, the basic principles of the case-that strict
liability and imposing the burden of proving truth on the defendant were
contrary to the goals of the First Amendment-were completely valid,
and the rule was a much needed change from common law principles.
The problem is that the "actual malice" rule is the only form of
constitutional protection in libel cases, and I am not sure the Court fully
thought through the consequences of that rule when Sullivan was
decided. In relying on the "marketplace of ideas" theory and
emphasizing the truth-seeking function, the Court-whether intentionally
or inadvertently-created a rule that places too much focus on the syntax
of a sentence and whether it is known to be technically true or false.
It is worth noting that Justice Brennan himself, the author of
Sullivan, later defended the protections of Sullivan by noting the problem
of seeking "truth." He wrote that the "difficulty of litigating the question
of 'truth' was a serious problem:
Our cases in the two decades since [Sullivan] bear
out this perception about the judicial risks of a
judicial test of truth. Often the spoken or written
word will capture a judgment, inference or
interpretation the "truth" of which is not readily
susceptible to adjudication. [Bose]. "Truth" will
often be a matter of degree or context. [Greenbelt].
Particularly when we debate the unwisdom of a
policy or political point of view, our perspective on
"truth" will be colored by the shared assumptions
of the day . . . . 59
58. Whether Gertz should have prevailed or whether other defenses were
available are separate issues; I am merely noting the distinction between the kinds of
speech at issue in Gertz and Rosenbloom, and that distinction provides a starting
point for determining whether a libel claim should have been permitted to move
forward.
59. Lee Levine & Stephen Wermiel, The Landmark That Wasn't: A First
Amendment Play in Five Acts, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1, 80 (2013) (discussing how
Sullivan was almost overruled by the Court in deciding Dun & Bradstreet v.
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Apparently, Justice Brennan debated whether he should advocate
for the position he took in Rosenbloom (to focus on whether the issue is a
matter of public concern) or to defend Gertz.60 Neither approach,
however, fully considers the range of matters that would be applicable in
libel cases, which may explain why the Court struggled so mightily to
develop satisfactory tests. Perhaps there would be less of a struggle if the
Court abandoned the search for "truth" and instead focused on the
expressive act of the speech at issue. Placing the emphasis on truth and
falsity leaves courts in an uncomfortable role of being an arbiter of
"truth," and imposes unnecessary limits on otherwise expressive
61
speech.
As many commentators have noted, the limits of Sullivan are
62
most clear in Norton v. Glenn. In Norton, a local newspaper published
an article that included the rants of a town councilman, who claimed that
another councilman was a "queer" and a "child molester., 6 3 The
statements were obviously nothing more than an angry rant that reflected
nothing about the accused, but instead showed the state of mind of the
ranting councilman. Yet the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not extend
any First Amendment protection to the statements because the only
constitutional protection the United States Supreme Court has offered to
speakers is the actual malice rule of Sullivan.4 Thus, if the reporter knew
the statements were false (or at least had good reason to doubt they were
true), he was not entitled to protection.
Intuitively, though, the Pennsylvania court knew the outcome
was wrong. It noted the "visceral appeal" of protecting the speech, but
65
felt it had no grounds to do so.
If the Court had considered various kinds of speech acts,
however, the speech in Norton would certainly have been protected as a
Greenmoss Builders, and evaluating the arguments made in draft opinions by the
justices) (the quote cited comes from one of Brennan's draft opinions).
60. Id. at 81-82.
61. Justice Brennan also noted that it was dangerous to make the courts the
arbiters of truth. When courts are given the power to "resolve ambiguous questions,"
citizens give up important freedoms and risk "imposed orthodoxy." He said, "it is far
better to risk error than suffer tyranny." Id. at 80.
62. 860 A.2d 48 (Pa. 2004).
63. Id. at 50.
64. Id. at 57.
65. Id.
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type of "reporting" because it shows what was said for a purpose other
than trying to persuade the audience that the speech is "true." Instead, it
points to a larger truth about the conduct of government officials, which
66
is valuable information that the First Amendment should protect.
IV. THE IMPACT OF SULLIVAN ON MODERN MEDIA
Although Sullivan did indeed give speakers great protection
when commenting on public officials and is important for that reason, the
underlying logic of the case is somewhat flawed and fails to protect
valuable and expressive speech in all cases. The emphasis on truth and
falsity and the subsequent public/private figure distinction that flowed
from the case has resulted in some skewed outcomes. We can talk with
relative impunity about whether a celebrity has a sexually transmitted
disease (assuming we do not know the allegation to be false) because
celebrities are public figures. However, (assuming all parties involved
are private figures) if we were to report that a local businessman is
stealing money from his clients based on information provided by the
businessman's accountant, we risk liability-even though the
information for the story was provide by a person in the best position to
know. We have ignored the role of the audience and relieved them of any
burden of having a reasonable, coherent interpretation of the credibility
of the statement. We have put journalists in the difficult role of having to
deliver "truth," despite the fact that they are not omniscient and do not
have perfect access to information and that sometimes the truth is that
people believe false things. And, we fail to protect the one thing that
reporters generally agree is a crucial part of their function-to convey
what was said. Many statements are important to convey simply because
there is value in knowing what a person said, aside from whether the
statement is true; the assessment of truth may still be important, but the
knowledge of the person's beliefs may be important, even if the belief is
false. In essence, Sullivan and its progeny did not create doctrine that
well reflects the realities of the world and the way humans communicate.
66. Protecting the speech at issue in Norton would have been easy to justify
applying speech act theory, but also applying a Meiklejohnian analysis or the
"checking value" theory.
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Moreover, the rule of Sullivan has not been adopted widely
internationally. Many countries have outright rejected the "actual
malice" rule.67 Media companies that publish internationally are now in a
position similar to American publishers prior to Sullivan. Several nations
take the position that statements are often not protected unless they can
be proven true, and that fact must be considered when assessing the risk
of publishing statements that might be deemed defamatory overseas. At
the same time, although the actual malice rule offers great protection in
the United States when reporting on the conduct of public officials, it is a
bit ironic that other nations-that are generally less protective of free
speech-have nevertheless adopted rules that arguably offer more
68protection for certain speech acts, such as reporting. I am not
suggesting that we set aside the actual malice rule or any other
protections, but I am suggesting that we need to look carefully at the
skewed outcomes we get given the rules in place today.
We should take the 50th anniversary of Sullivan as an
opportunity to reflect on how and why we want to protect speech so that
going forward the Court can cultivate doctrine that more fairly reflects
the principles that truly allow speech to be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open.
67. Kyu Ho Youm, "Actual Malice" in U.S. Defamation Law: The Minority of
One Doctrine in the World?, 4 J. INT'L MEDIA & ENT. L. 1 (2011-12).
68. Kyu Ho Youm, Liberalizing British Defamation Law: A Case ofImporting
the First Amendment?, 13 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 415 (2008) (noting the British courts
have given weight to the notion of neutral reportage).
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